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I.
The Costs of Accidents has a somewhat misleading title.' There are
no data here to interest the National Safety Council or Nader's Raiders.
In fact, there are no data at all, and thereby hangs one of the interesting
questions about this book.
Calabresi's stated object is to lay a "theoretical foundation for acci-
dent law," 2 by explicitly employing a body of conceptual and analytical
material drawn from the province of economics. Indeed, the book may
to law-trained readers seem more a treatise on economics than a "law"
book. Yet its particular ways of focusing, refining, and expressing3
economic material clearly reflect a lawyer-like earthiness, compulsion to
detail, and concern for institutional function.
Others must say whether The Costs of Accidents will be interesting to
economists. It would not surprise me to learn-though I am breath-
takingly unqualified to say-that Galabresi is operating well within the
frontiers of economic theory. It would, however, surprise me greatly to
be told that he sheds no new light on ground already worked over. My
guess is that, by training theory on a problem-that of accidents-which
I believe has not been prominent in economic discussion, Calabresi will
have done enough in the way of reformulating concepts, revealing
unsuspected relationships among them, and pressing certain arguments
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Not to mention the dust-jacket, which appears to be a non-representational depiction
of a heroic smash-up. Something evoking Ariadne and the Labyrinth would have been
more fitting.
2. See G. CLMABaRsI, THE Cosrs oF AccimEmrs: A LEGAL A m' Eco.n|oc AmLYsts 1. 7-10(1970) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
3. Calabresi sticks to discourse. The customary graphic and algebraic accoutrements
of economics literature are foregone.
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to high degrees of detail and refinement, to make his efforts worthy of
an economist's time.
But Calabresi's chief object has not been to expound or advance
economic theory. Rather, it has been to provide a conceptual apparatus
for describing, comprehending, and evaluating systems of accident law;
and it is with respect to that (obviously worthy) object that his book
should be evaluated. It is important to understand that Calabresi's own
contribution to "a theory of accident law" lies not in posing empirically
testable hypotheses, or in analyzing with detailed data the relative
merits of competing proposals for accident law reform. The value of
his conceptual apparatus, Calabresi suggests, is "to indicate the ques-
tions we must ask in deciding whether one system [of accident law] is
preferable to another."4 Put another way, Calabresi's concepts direct
our attention to the implicit questions and answers-the assumptions-
concerning human behavior, economic impact, and political values
which are embedded in proposals for accident law reform. As Calabresi
notes, some of these questions are "essentially empirical"6-that is,
their answers require the gathering and analysis of data-and others
seem to be largely "political," in the broad sense of turning on some
group decision about competing values. The goal of Calabresi's con-
ceptual apparatus is to articulate these questions with some precision,
and to provide some overarching concepts with which to compare
different proposals and structure future research.
In assessing Calabresi's efforts toward this goal, it will be necessary
to begin with some recapitulation of the book's contents. I confess this
is a task which fills me with despair. Calabresi's book is a nigh-inex-
haustible (though sometimes exhausting) trove of arguments, rejoinders,
perspectives, considerations, and satellite topics-all of which, one feels
certain, must themselves already have been mercilessly distilled by the
author out of an even more fulsome vat of seething thought. I shall be
satisfied if, in sketching out a few of the main lines of argument, I can
convey some feeling not only for the book's inimitable style but also for
the causes thereof. Calabresi has given us an amazing concoction of
cragginess and grace, of homely example and mindcracking neologism,
of lucidity and abstrusity, of steadfast focus and spiralling digression;
but the subject seems highly resistent to linear and transparent exposi-
tion, and I am convinced that Calabresi has done well to domesticate it
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After presenting the outlines of Calabresi's conceptual apparatus and
indicating the kinds of applications he has in mind for it, I shall under-
take some interpretation and criticism of the key distinction used by
Calabresi in organizing his book-that between "general deterrence"
and "specific deterrence"--and suggest that there may be a more en-
lightening way of formulating the thought than the one Calabresi has
used. I shall than set his concepts to work on some issues presently
receiving a good deal of discussion in the field of air-pollution control,
as a way of further understanding and testing the power of Calabresi's
theoretical framework to guide and clarify thought about the economic
implications of legal regulation.
II.
A. Goals, False and True
Calabresi opens his discussion by warning against some "myths"
whose prevalence, he says, encumbers thought about accident-cost prob-
lems. The first myth is that it is (or ought to be) our aim to avoid acci-
dents at all costs. On the contrary, says Calabresi, "[o]ur society is not
committed to preserving life at any cost." 6 Rather, it often appears to
trade off accident costs against those of curbing accident-prone activities.
We could avoid spending human lives and limbs on the building of
tunnels, if we were ready to pay the extra costs of getting by Mont
Blanc. The second (and converse) myth which Calabresi warns against
is that "economic laws give absolute answers" 7-the proposition that if
an activity meets the test of the market after paying all the accident
costs assessed to it (through private contract and tort law), it has thereby
established its right to be let alone. In response, Calabresi points out
that not all the negative judgments which society might reasonably
make about an accident-causing activity can be expected to materialize
in market transactions. Some of the judgments might contain "moral"
elements and so defy accurate market valuation (consider, for example,
the case of automobile speeders, or environmental damage from an oil
spill). Others might be monetizable in principle, but for practical rea-
sons be impossible to channel through the market (consider, e.g., the
costs of treating chronic ailments caused or aggravated by pollution of
the air). These points may seem so obvious as not to require militant
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persons who start by pledging allegiance to these axioms are sometimes
prone to betray them in the heat of battle."
Another "myth" is that "a necessary financial link exists between
injurers and victims." There may be a natural tendency for people to
think about the problem as if accident costs must either be left on
victims or, if shifted at all, shifted to the "injurers" whose activities seem
to have caused the accident. But, as various social-insurance schemes
illustrate, our choices are not really so limited.
Calabresi analyzes accident costs into three sub-categories, which he
seems to distinguish according to what can be done to reduce the costs
in each. "Primary costs" are those which most of us would tend to think
of as accident costs proper-the costs which can be reduced only by
terminating or altering one or more of the various activities whose
interaction culminates in the costly event called an accident. It is these
costs which can only be optimized, but never eliminated, because termi.
nation or alteration of the accident-generating activities is itself costly.
"Secondary costs" are those, generally materializing as economic dis.
location or aggravation of injury, which can be reduced even after the
costly interaction of "primary" activities has already come to pass,
simply by "spreading" the costs over time or among persons rather than
leaving them immediately and heavily concentrated on one or a few
persons.10 Calabresi is at pains to show that these costs may be quite real
and quite avoidable, and that the issue is not merely one of shifting
them about from one time or person to another. A failure to spread
may result in a failure to provide timely medical treatment which can
shore up the victim's long-term health prospects. A bit more subtly, a
failure to spread may force a quantum change in the victim's "class" or
"life-style"-itself detrimental to welfare-which spreading could have
averted. Unlike primary costs, secondary costs could apparently be
reduced to near zero by adequate spreading. Finally, there are "tertiary
8. Compare Posner, Book Review, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 636, 638 (1970), with id. at 615.
See also J. EsPosITo, VANISHING AIR 306 (1970), recommending that pollution "ought to be
stopped whenever and wherever possible," and calling for "[j]egislation . . . founded on
the principle of reducing atmospheric contamination to the greatest extent technologlically
possible." Esposito's view seems to proceed not blindly from the first myth (which It
superficially resembles) but from a more sophisticated and deliberate choice influenced
strongly by special sensitivity to the hazards of suspected but yet-uncomprehended
biological harm. See id. at 307.
9. P. 22.
10. Calabresi does not include among secondary costs any resentment or demoraliza-
tion which might flow from a failure to compensate. See Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation' Law, 80
HARv. L. Rav. 1165, 1214 (1967). Insofar as he would take note of such effects at all, It




costs"-the "friction" or "transaction" costs of operating whatever ad-
ministrative or market machinery we utilize for the control of primary
and secondary costs. Tertiary costs, too, could in theory be reduced to
zero if agreement could be reached simply to leave all accident costs on
victims as and when they accrue.
In offering his three-fold analysis of accident costs, Calabresi is of
course not merely engaging in classification for the fun of it. The classi-
fication is a prelude to the argument-sustained, really, throughout the
book-that the search for an ideal system of accident-cost control must
partake heavily of a "systems" approach, because it is very likely that
any method which can drastically reduce one category of costs will
interfere significantly with control of costs in another category.
Thus, there are two quite distinct senses in which secondary costs
may be called a problem. First and most simply, they are a problem
insofar as they exist and could be reduced, Giving this meaning to "the
problem of secondary costs," it is no doubt reasonable to suggest that
the problem might be "adequately taken care of by the availability of
medical, life, and disability insurance, in which event we could largely
forget about that problem and concentrate on primary accident costs."",
But, as Calabresi is at great and repeated pains to remind us, secondary
costs are also a "problem" in the sense that the spreading devices used to
control them tend to interfere (through what Calabresi calls "externali-
zation by transfer") with deterrence arrangements useful for the control
of primary costs. For example, we might choose to rely on "medical, life,
and disability insurance" to solve the problem of secondary costs on,
say, drivers who get hurt in two-car accidents. But such reliance would
prevent us from seeking primary accident-cost reduction through the
deterrence which might flow from requiring drivers to shoulder the
costs of accidents which they are deemed to cause. In this latter sense,
the problem of secondary costs is always with us because it is inextri-
cably intertwined with the ineradicable problem of primary costs.
From what has been said, the reader can easily deduce how Calabresi
formulates the over-all objective of an ideal system of accident law; the
goal is to minimize the sum of primary, secondary, and tertiary costs
(including within primary costs any benefits forgone for the sake of
avoiding accidents). To this it is necessary to add that we are to seek
this optimum while avoiding injustice. "Justice" is thus explicitly rele,
gated to a background role, entering into the schema as a constraint
rather than as a goal.
11. Posner, supra note 8, at 6$8-39,
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It is not only a rather passive, but also a rather specialized view of
justice we encounter here. The constraint, as discussed by Calabresi,
has two important focuses: equity as between the parties to an accident,
injurer and victim; and consistency as among all injurers, or all victims,
who appear to be similarly circumstanced. Calabresi's concentration on
these aspects of justice may stem from his focus on the accident prob-
lem, and particularly on the "fault" system of allocating accident costs--
a system which is often defended because of its alleged capacity to work
justice as between the injurer and victim in any given accident, and just
as often attacked because of the asserted irrelevance (from the point of
view of victims) of its criteria for selecting which out of all accident
victims to compensate.
B. Deterrence, General and Specific
The major portion of Calabresi's book is devoted to consideration of
primary-cost control. Two basic methods are identified, and respectively
labelled "general" (or "market") deterrence and "specific" (or "collec-
tive") deterrence. For now, let us say that the distinction between them
is that under general deterrence, assignments of worth to accident-caus-
ing activities-and therefore decisions about how far to go in
diminishing or altering such activities for the sake of accident costs
thereby saved-are left to the market; while under specific deterrence
the comparative evaluation of an activity and its accident costs, and
the related decision about how far the activity should be restricted or
modified, are collectively made.
General deterrence is exemplified by a rule holding manufacturers
strictly liable12 for injury caused by their machinery. Such a rule exerts
deterrent pressure against more-or-less accident-prone manufacturers of,
say, snowmobiles by inducing them to account in their net-profit
calculations for the costs of damage judgments associated with their
unmodified production activities; and to trade off the gross costs of
various ways of making the product safer against the resultant savings
in accident-cost liabilities, in a search for the optimum procedure. If
even that turns out to involve a below-market rate of return for the
industry's ablest competitors, manufacture of the product (which is now
shown to cause more accident costs than it is otherwise worth in the
market) presumably will cease.18 The essential point, as regards the
12. Throughout this review, I shall use the phrases "strictly liable" and "strict
liability" to refer to imposition of liability without regard to fault, and also without
regard to abnormality or defect.
13. Or, less extremely, prices will rise and total demanud (and output) will fall.
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distinction between general and specific deterrence, is that the decision
about whether production justifies itself in view of accident costs-or
the search for means by which production can be beneficially altered
so that it will justify itself in view of these costs-is left (through the
manufacturer's profit-seeking) to the market.
Specific deterrence is exemplified by a penal law prohibiting the sale
or use of snowmobiles in heavily populated areas. The law, we may as-
sume, is largely motivated by the accident-proneness of snowmobiles in
such settings. In case of doubt about whether that accident-proneness,
when added to the other costs of producing snowmobiles, actually over-
balances the recreational and other benefits derived from snowmobiling,
a market test might be arranged through strict manufacturers' or
sellers' liability. The indulgence in a collective prohibition might,
therefore, seem to indicate unusual certitude about how the economic
balance tilts-so as to make the market test itself seem unnecessarily
costly. Calabresi recognizes that such certitude may explain some uses
of specific deterrence; but he seems more interested in other cases which
are to be explained by societal insistence on injecting non-monetizable,
non-transactionalizable factors--"moral" factors, in short-into the
equation. Thus the anti-snowmobile law may result from (a) a collective
devaluation of recreational benefits reflecting an anti-snowmobile, con-
servationist sentiment in the community, and (b) a comparison of this
adjusted value with accident and other production costs. In either case,
the essential point is that society has not scrupled to dictate its own,
collective findings-implicitly as to the terms on either side of the
equation and explicitly as to the ultimate solution.
1. General Deterrence and Collective Decisions
Now for a closer look at general deterrence. Returning to our
example of strict manufacturers' liability, it is to be noted that for all
its intent to throw "the decision for [or against] accidents"' 4 back onto
the market, a strict-liability rule still entails significant collective inter-
vention in the process at two critical points. Society through its legisla-
tive or judicial organs is of course the author of the very decision
(through strict liability) to assign accident costs to manufacturers rather
than victims; and society through its courts evaluates the costs of all
accidents (directly through litigation of those which do not lead to
voluntary settlement, and indirectly, through the background threat
14. See Calabresi, The Decision for Acddents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 iAItv. L. REv. 718 (1965).
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of litigation, where cases are settled). These two collective decisions
exemplify two general questions respectively called by Calabresi "what-
is-a-cost-of-what" and "what-is-the-cost."' 15 A central proposition of his
theory is that collective decision of these two questions is inescapable in
any system of primary accident-cost control, no matter how closely it
seeks to be tied to the market.
a. Assignment of Liability-Cheapest Cost Avoiders and
Externalization
What-is-a-cost-of-what is the decision about which activity, of the two
or more whose convergence results in given accident costs, should be
said to have "caused" (or, in the Calabresian usage, should be "held
liable" for) those costs. To say that law is in any sense deployed for
purposes of controlling primary accident costs is precisely to say that
what-is-a-cost-of-what is being decided collectively. There is no escape,
because leaving costs on victims is itself a choice. This choice may be
adopted because it is thought optimal for primary-cost control-
because, for example, rotary-mower dismemberments are thought best
controlled by pressuring users to wear protective shoes-but that is to
say that a collective decision has been made about whether liability for
such accidents is better assigned to manufacture and/or sale of mowers
or, alternatively, to ill-shod use of them.
Since, then (contrary to still another "myth"), 1 the idea of strict
manufacturer's (or "enterprise") liability provides no sure guide to how
liability ought to be allocated for general-deterrence purposes, what is
the principle which ought to be followed? In developing his own con-
clusion-that rules should be set so that liability will come to rest on
"the cheapest cost-avoider"--Calabresi draws heavily on a seminal arti.
cle by economist Ronald Coase. 17 The starting point is that in a world
where voluntary transactions could be arranged costlessly, primary-cost
optimization would result irrespective of the initial placement of
liability and we could therefore (except for possible concern about
secondary costs or justice) leave it on victims. Thus, suppose it to be
clear that the cheapest means to significant reduction of rotary-mower
accidents are those, such as altered design, lying within the control of
manufacturers. Manufacturers would, then, by definition be the
"cheapest cost-avoiders." But no collective shift of liability to manu-
15. In this review I shall often refer to them, respectively, as "the liability question"
and "the cost-valuation question."
16. i.e., that "risk distribution is selfexplanatory." See p. 20.
17. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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facturers would be required because, by our hypothesis that product
alteration is a cheaper method of accident-cost avoidance than protec-
tive clothing or reduced use of mowers, the victims on whom accident
costs initially fall would find it worth their while to compensate
("bribe") manufacturers for the cost of altering the product-if, but
only if, that cost were less than the costs of accidental injuries thereby
avoided. The market would, indeed, function just as efficaciously if we
decided that mower-accident costs should be placed initially on rock
musicians. Holding our other assumptions constant, we can assume that
the musicians would in due course figure out that (a) there is nothing
much they can do directly about the problem (they are not the cheapest
cost-avoiders) (Calabresi calls this step an "initial rough guess"); (b) a
dollar spent compensating manufacturers for altering the product saves
more accident costs than one spent compensating users for wearing
protective clothing or giving up mowing; and (c) dollars spent thus
compensating manufacturers are (or are not) worth their savings in
accident-cost liabilities. Depending on which conclusion is reached on
item (c), manufacturers will (or will not) be bribed by musicians to
alter the product-which is the efficient solution.
It should be obvious that the reason for not taking such a compla-
cent view of the market's ability to optimize is the falsity of our starting
assumption that transactions are costless. If we know for sure that
manufacturers are the cheapest cost-avoiders, there is no reason for
incurring the tertiary costs of transactions required before a liability
placed initially on mower-users or rock musicians will come to rest on
manufacturers, where it "belongs." Indeed, by not placing the liability
directly on manufacturers, we run the risk that the efficient solution
will be lost because the transaction costs of shifting liabilities become
so large for, say, rock musicians, that it is cheaper all told for them just
to pay the accident bills.
Unfortunately, it is not always quite obvious who the cheapest cost
avoider is. What should we do if in doubt as between rotary-mower
manufacturers and users? Calabresi offers a number of "guidelines" for
handling this problem. An important one is to avoid "externaliza-
tion." ' In our mower case we might note that if mower-accident costs
are placed on users, users-responding to the marketing practices of the
insurance industry-may tend to classify these costs among the general
risks of personal injury associated with being alive and active, and so
leave them to be taken care of by general accident and health insur-
18. See p. 144.
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ance. The costs of such insurance do not reflect specifically the fre-
quency or severity of mower accidents, and so exert no particular
pressure towards behavior modifications (like heavy shoes or reduced
mower consumption) specifically adapted to mower accident cost reduc-
tion. For any user who carries accident and health insurance anyway,
the question of investing in mower-proof shoes depends how their costs
compare with the risks to him of mower-accident costs, considering that
the insurance benefits will be available. In short, some of the desired
accident-cost pressure has been allowed to escape from decision-making
about mower use (been "externalized") and thereby deprived of its
deterrent effect. Any likelihood that this will happen, Calabresi suggests,
would argue for initial placement of liability on manufacturers because
they seem very likely to be, among imaginable cost avoiders, the
"cheapest" who are reasonably susceptible of being deterred by market
pressures.
b. Assignment of Liability-The Need for Prospective Rules
The inescapable collective decision of what-is-a-cost-of-what may, as
Calabresi shows, be made on a highly individual basis with reference to
each costly incident as it arises, or on a less individualized basis with
reference to classes of incidents resulting from similar interactions of
general categories of activity. The difference can be illustrated through
Calabresi's argument that the latter sort of decision-making is to be pre-
ferred for general deterrence in the accident field. His basic point seems
to be that the proper cost pressures cannot adequately be brought to
bear on accident-prone activities by leaving it to individual actors to
extrapolate from a series of retrospective liability-placing decisions the
statistical cost which is thereby being loaded onto "their" activities. Not
enough information is conveyed (at the stage where decisions "for ac-
cidents" or against them must be made) by a rule placing liability on
that activity retrospectively judged to be the cheapest cost-avoider in the
particular case. Prospective (i.e., categorical) rules are necessary for this
purpose, probably couched in terms of fairly broad classes of activity
(driving, driving while intoxicated, selling cars, walking on the streets
at dusk), and in terms of classes of accidents involving pairs of these
activity classes ("Cars are liable for costs of collisions between cars and
bicycles.") Stated another way, in order to exert effective deterrent pres-
sures liability rules must define insurable classes of activity; and a class
such as "activity which, in a given case, is retrospectively determined to
have been the cheapest cost-avoider" obviously will not do. Having
gotten this far, it is easy for Calabresi to go on and show that categor-
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ization will in any event occur (through private insurance) despite
insistence by the official system on case-by-case identification of the
cheapest cost-avoider-so that the official case-by-case determination
involves wasteful tertiary expenditure, unless we (absurdly) prohibit
insurance and rely (stupidly) on extrapolation of costs by individual
actors. 19
c. Valuation of Costs
Let us now turn to the what-is-the-cost question. Calabresi argues
that this one, too, must be decided collectively in any system of primary
accident-cost control (except, of course, insofar as liability is left on the
victim). His claim seems persuasive. Suppose first that decisions about
who is liable are to be made on a case-by-case basis-which is to say
retrospectively-for each accident. In that case, decisions about what-is-
the-cost could hardly be left to the market, by having the victim bargain
with any injurer who is being held liable for the accident. The parties
at this point can bargain ("settle") only in the limited sense of trying to
predict how the costs would be collectively valued in litigation. Neither
has anything to concede except his prediction that a collective judgment
of the accident costs will be higher (or lower) than his adversary claims;
and neither has anything to trade for the other's concession except the
prospect of saving litigation costs. Bargaining so constricted is but an
appendage of collective evaluation; it is not a discrete process of market
evaluation.
Suppose, alternatively, that the liability question is to be decided by
prospective assignment of the costs of defined classes of accidents to de-
fined classes of activity-for example, by a rule that mower manu-
facturers are strictly liable for all mowing injuries, or that drivers are
liable in all car-pedestrian collisions. There is some reason to believe
that in the mower case the what-is-the-cost question can now be left to
19. Another flaw found by Calabresi in case-by-case determination is that in focusing
on what went wrong in the particular case, the s'stem may ignore that insurable category
of activity which is, of all such categories involved in the accident under consideration, the
cheapest cost avoider. Case-by-case decision, "because it centers on the possible particular
cost avoider" such as absent-mindedness, drunken, or drowsy driving, "is very likely to
ignore the recurring cost avoider and hence fail altogether to consider some potential
cheapest cost avoiders such as highway builders or tire-makers." (P. 256). It is not an
adequate response that under a "fault" s)stem an injurer can escape liability by holwing
that "not it but a stranger to the proceeding-the manufacturer of the automobile, the
contractor who built the roadway . . . -was the one 'at fault' . . ." (Posner, supra note 8.
at 645.) Insofar as this is so, it may compound rather than cure the defect, for the result
of allowing this defense may be not to shift the cost to the putative cheapest cost avoider,
but to "externalize" it by leaving it on a victim who may well represent that activity which
is the least capable cost avoider of all those involved.
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market determination. Manufacturers can offer mowers at reduced
prices in exchange for the purchaser's waiver of accident liability claims
-so that the difference in market prices of mowers sold subject to
waiver and those sold "straight" would represent a true market evalua.
tion of mower accident costs.20 Calabresi does not argue that this is impos-
sible, but only that it is undesirable given severe limitations on consumer
information and self-discipline.21 In the auto-driver case, though, it is
literally impossible to construct such a market in accidental injuries.
There is no transaction, prior to the accident itself, to link the injurers
with their potential victims; and no way, therefore, for drivers to
purchase advance releases from the liabilities to which they are exposed.
Insurers can know the accident costs of driving only by extrapolation
from a series of collective what-is-the-cost decisions, no one of which can
be made until after occurrence of the accident to which it relates. In
sum, it seems impossible in the auto-accident field to create a pure
system of market deterrence. Whenever a deliberate shift of liability is
instigated for deterrent purposes, collective cost evaluation must to some
extent be substituted for that of affected individuals. But leaving all
costs on victims--which would assure their receiving a highly individ-
ualized evaluation-would also surely result in a great deal of ex-
ternalization (that is, of cost-bearing by those who are very poor cost-
avoiders).
III.
The ideas and arguments so far summarized occupy substantial por-
tions of Calabresi's book-the least difficult and, I would guess, the least
original portions. They fairly represent the book's intellectual concerns,
style and approach, but not its subtlety and complexity. Calabresi is not
so susceptible to summary restatement when he digs into such matters
as the possible reasons for preferring specific to general deterrence; or
the implications of using variants of specific deterrence such as taxation
or licensing in order to limit the total amount of an accident-prone
activity (but not restrict it absolutely), or of imposing sanctions for
violation of a specific-deterrence rule only when an accident results; or
when he analyzes special externalization problems which arise in Con.
20. Note that if heavy shoes are a cheaper cost-avoidance method than product altera.
tion or reduced mower use, buyers can choose the "waiver" price and buy shoes with a
part of their savings; and that, once an equilibrium is reached, the waiver savings should
not exceed the price of protective shoes.
21. See pp. 55-58.
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nection with "pain and suffering," or in trying to define neither too
narrowly nor too broadly a specifically restricted category of activity; or
the various ways in which specific and general deterrence will interact
as to any activity whether we like it or not, and how we might go about
deliberately turning such interactions to our advantage.
What finally results is not a blueprint for an ideal system of accident
law, nor even a computer program which will cough up a blueprint as
soon as we provide the data or the guesses for assigning values to all the
parameters. We get, rather, an apparatus for assisting both creative and
critical thought about the design of accident-law systems. Once we are
able to define a problem in manageable terms and proportions, Cala-
bresi's apparatus enables us to think and speak dearly about such mat-
ters as general-deterrence approaches which might be available at rea-
sonable sacrifice in secondary and tertiary costs; the alternative specific
deterrence approaches available; and how we can select one approach to
lean on most heavily while using others for backup purposes.
To get a flavor of the kind of "application" Calabresi himself seems
to contemplate for his work, consider some of his offerings2- on the
question of "first-party" versus "third-party" auto liability schemes--a
matter which attracts his attention at several points in the book.m Al-
though much of the current argument about this question seems to rage
about issues of tertiary costs and justice, Calabresi asks us to observe
also the possibility of a significant primary-cost issue. Insurers, he sug-
gests, might be expected to respond to first-party liability by setting up
rate categories which favor heavy, armor-plated cars that effectively
protect their occupants though they may be especially devastating to
what they hit. If our collective judgment is that increasing the pro-
portion of smaller and lighter cars would tend to reduce primary ac-
cident costs, we can use specific deterrence (e.g., an excise tax on auto-
mobile weight)24 to counteract any insurer preference for tanks. But our
very consideration of such action should make us reconsider whether
first-party insurance is really what we want, or whether there is not some
22. Actually, this is my blending of observations offered by Calabresi at scattered places
in his book.
23. A third-party scheme is one, such as the prevalent "fault" system, in which a driver
or auto owner is exposed to (and insures against) the risk or being held liable to owners
and occupants of other cars. A first-party scheme is one in which the owner's or driver's
only risk (against which he insures) is that of injury to himself, his car, and its oc-
cupants. (Liability to pedestrians might be handled in various ways under either t)pe of
scheme.)
24. As to whether such a tax would "really" be "specific" and not "general" deterrence,
see p. 665 infra.
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other way to attack the tertiary-cost problem which doesn't push us in
an undesired direction as regards auto design.
More fundamentally, we shall have to consider whether, under any
scheme which casts accident cost on cars, insurers will find it worthwhile
to categorize, for rate-setting purposes, with reference to the insured
car, the insured driver, or both. If, for example, it is so much cheaper
or effective for insurers to categorize by driver that drivers will be dif-
ferentiated but cars lumped together, we might deplore both the in-
justice (as we see it) to elderly drivers or to households with youthful
members, and the externalization of deterrent pressure against unsafe
auto design and manufacture. We could respond to the latter problem
through specific deterrence; but we might also consider whether both
could be handled by forbidding rate differentiation on grounds of age
and using specific deterrence to restrict the driving privileges of ac-
cident-prone drivers-thereby perhaps making it worthwhile for in-
surers to introduce rate differentiation according to cars, since worth-
while differentiation by driver would no longer be permitted.
Now obviously a discussion of this kind can be called an "application"
(my word, not Calabresi's) only in a rather peculiar, intermediate sense.
It takes theory-or, if you will, speculation-expressed at a somewhat
remote level of generality and abstraction and "applies" it to a quite
concrete and topical problem. Yet the discussion remains theoretical in
the sense that it is not empirical. There are still no data. We can see
that Calabresi's system might assist us greatly, insofar as we can be rea-
sonably sure that insurer behavior (say) will actually correspond to
Calabresi's economic model. His suggestion that it will may ring true
to our ears; but no factual verification is offered.
My own opinion is that there is precious little cause here for dis-
paragement of Calabresi's achievement, though he has been tasked
with failure to provide or pursue empirical verification.2 5 It is true that
some assumption about human behavior will be found at each joint of
the conceptual framework-such as that firms try to maximize profits
(minimize losses); or that tort liability unaccompanied by economic
pain will not deter; or that individuals systematically undervalue the
risks of serious bodily injury to themselves. Without such assumptions it
would, indeed, be impossible to talk both coherently and conceptually
about the accident-cost problem; one's attempt to fashion a coherent
conceptual framework would be off in the realm of pure reason. And
yet any self-respecting empiricist will tell you that empirical rigor is
25. See Posner, supra note 8, at 647.
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impossible except in intimate association with hypothetical rigor-or,
in other words, that a good, pertinent conceptual framework is in-
dispensable.
But Calabresi does not himself believe that a conceptual framework
for further research-a hypothesis generator-is all he has produced.
He speaks somewhat ambivalently to the question of using his "applica-
tions," and others which might be derived from his more general
arguments, in the absence of empirical validation, but plainly he
thinks it a mistake to forbear from evaluation of existing and proposed
systems until all the relevant data are in. I find it hard to dispute his
claim that it is sometimes wisest to act on impressionistic assumptions-
depending on how strong these seem and on how unlikely we are,
within a reasonable time, to get anything better. Even readers who balk
at that should at least admit that a powerful conceptual engine can use-
fully be run "in reverse," so to speak-for example, to demonstrate (as
with the "first-party" question briefly discussed above) that proper
evaluation of a proposal requires attention to certain factual or valua-
tional issues which have, so far, been insufficiently specified; or to
show that a proposal or extant practice logically entails assumptions
which so sharply contradict our instincts or impressions as to shed grave
doubt on its soundness.2 6
IV.
Considering how heavily the organization of Calabresi's book is made
to depend on the distinction between general and specific deterrence,
he is surprisingly, even disconcertingly, diffident in his claims for the
ultimate validity of these key concepts-for their capacity to distinguish
sharply and dependably among events or situations for prescriptive or
deductive purposes. Indeed, Calabresi is content to use them as a mere
convenience in organizing discourse-as a compendious descriptive
terminology through which he can refer to fluid and overlapping com-
binations of regulatory techniques (which he calls "approaches") for
purposes of offering two somewhat different, but related sets of gen-
eralizations about them. The trouble is that this is too modest a usage
for such an imposing locution. Readers generally will find it difficult
to avoid over-commitment to Calabresi's descriptive categories; or, put-
ting it differently, will be convinced by his treatment of them that
something of fundamental significance must lurk behind them. By not
26. For an illustration, see pp. 678-79 infra.
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being more explicit than he has been about what that something is,
Calabresi allows the usage to be surrounded by an unnecessarily dis-
quieting aura of arbitrariness and vagueness which evokes doubts (I
think mistaken) about its utility and "reality."
Understanding would be deepened, I believe, by backing off from
Calabresi's characteristic attempt to sub-classify regulatory techniques
and "approaches" in terms of his major conceptual distinction, and by
focusing instead on distinguishing among the functions or goals of
legislative action in the area of controlling accident costs. To articulate
this "functional" distinction requires some clarification of the central
elements of Calabresi's conceptual scheme.
A "cost" is an adverse impact on a choice-maker. The cost is
"monetizable" if it would make sense to the choice-maker to enter into
an exchange transaction with regard to that cost-either compensating
another to be rid of it, or demanding compensation himself for bearing
it. The cost may be non-monetizable either because the costs of arrang-
ing the "monetizing" exchange seem to outweigh potential benefits from
the exchange (i.e., the cost is small in relation to transaction costs),2 7 or
because it involves "moral" elements for which no satisfactory exchange
equivalents can be found. Another characteristic of "moral" costs which
may impede exchange transactions in regard to them is that they may
bear a non-linear relationship to increments in the volume or rate of
the activities which generate them-so that, in extreme instances, a
continuous and marginal increment in the generating activity may move
us discontinuously from a situation in which the cost is virtually un-
noticed to one which presses the outer limits of tolerance.
The choice-maker upon which costs are deemed to impinge can be
an individual household or firm, or it can be a group of households
and/or firms acting concertedly. Because concerted action very likely
entails concession and compromise by members of the group, any cost
which is fully monetizable by individuals will probably be valued more
accurately through voluntary exchange transactions among individuals
than through some more centralized process. There are, however, likely
to be some impacts which a group would effectively recognize as costs
but which individuals would often fail to monetize. This may occur
when the aggregation of severally minute or indeterminate impacts on
individual members produces a total cost which seems worth doing
27. For this purpose, at least, we can include in "transaction costs" the costs to the
choice-maker of developing information necessary for an accurate valuation of the
"primary cost" which, absent such information, remains non-monetizable.
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something about by some means available only to the group, or because
the group is willing to act in response to violations of its collective
morality (i.e., a morality which is prevalent among its members), even
though a significant number of individuals would not voluntarily act
according to that same moral judgment.
In any case in which a group finds it potentially worthwhile to act in
regard to costs which for many individuals will be non-existent or non-
monetizable, the group may further conclude that the benefits of ap-
propriate group action will outweigh any undesirable effects of ignoring
or overriding individual preferences and cost evaluations. When this
conclusion is reached, the group will act.
Groups may be of greater or lesser size, and larger groups may include
numbers of smaller groups. Just as given costs may call for a judgment
about whether they are more effectively taken into account by individuals
or a group, so may there be need for a like judgment as between smaller,
less inclusive groups and larger, more inclusive groups. "Decentraliza-
tion" is preference for cost accounting and avoidance by smaller, less
inclusive groups and, ultimately, by individuals.
There are two distinct functions performed by a legislative body
when, with a view to optimizing the cost output of some activity, it
establishes rules for allocating liabilities and evaluating costs. We can
call these "centralizing" and "decentralizing" functions. The central-
izing function arises out of the possibility we have discussed that the
legislature, or some other relatively inclusive group, will perceive in
certain kinds of activities costs which will not otherwise be recognized
or monetized either by those who control the means of economically
avoiding such costs or by others with whom they transact. The centraliz-
ing function, then, consists of coercing potential cost avoiders into act-
ing in accordance with the legislature's, or relatively inclusive group's,
perceptions of costliness.
The decentralizing function arises out of the opposite possibility that
certain costs can be most accurately valued by the most decentralized
set of choice-makers able and motivated to recognize and monetize
them; and that sacrifices economically necessary to avoid such costs can
be most accurately valued by those who would have to make the sacri-
fices. The decentralizing function, then, is to provide a framework for
voluntary transactions designed to maximize the probabilities that
individuals or relatively small groups will be motivated to recognize
and monetize costs, with the result that those who could avoid costs
with the least sacrifice will be motivated to consider whether the sac-
rifice is worthwhile.
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Viewing the two functions in light of one another, it can be said that
the first is what the legislature does insofar as it cannot invent an ac-
ceptable way to feed group perceptions of costliness into decision
processes more decentralized than those processes which it actually pre-
scribes; while the second is what the legislature does in order to avoid,
insofar as possible, having to do the first. By thus describing the two
functions circularly in terms of one another, we can see that inter-
penetration between them is virtually inevitable in any legislative action
involving either one.
The centralizing function of course corresponds in a general way to
Calabresi's "specific deterrence"; while the decentralizing function
generally corresponds to Calabresi's "general deterrence." But the cor-
respondence is general only. Calabresi applies his terms to techniques
and approaches, and there is little use in trying to sort these according
to function performed because many of them perform both functions
in varying degrees. And this is most precisely-indeed, definitionally-
true of those complex, "mixed" techniques which most require the
kind of clarifying discussion which the Calabresian insights generate-
techniques such as licenses, regulatory taxes, restrictions (e.g., against
driving without "due care") which are enforced only against
those violations which lead to consummated harm, and categorization
of activities for purposes of collective liability assignment or cost evalua-
tion.
We can, to be sure, allow ourselves to think about what techniques
would be used if only the centralizing function were to be served (be-
cause, say, the slightest degree of decentralization was thought to un-
dermine intolerably the collective cost appraisals); or what techniques
would be used if only the decentralizing function were to be served
(because all collective evaluations were totally mistrusted). We would
in short order arrive at Calabresi's "worlds" of "total specific deter-
rence" 28 and "perfect general deterrence,"2 and would spend as little
time in these wonderlands as Calabresi does himself. Analytically speak-
ing, every technique or approach which is not of those "pure" worlds,
and which is of the real world, is a "mixed system"--not centralizing or
"specific deterrence," not decentralizing or "general deterrence," but
both.
My criticism is not that Calabresi has failed to understand this, for
that-as his own evocation and dismissal of the "pure worlds" exempli-
28. See pp. 111-13.
29. See pp. 88-94.
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fies-is plainly not true. Nor do I mean to suggest that the distinction
I have proposed with regard to legislative functions has escaped Cala-
bresi, for he has essentially identified the two functions in discussing
the respective "bases" of general and specific deterrence.O What I
question, rather, is the decision not to maintain a sharp focus on the
functional distinction as the key to a unified discourse on techniques,
but instead to undertake a bifurcated discussion which cannot help
reinforcing an idea that Calabresi knows is wrong-that some tech-
niques are general deterrence while others are specific deterrence. Per-
haps the best illustration of the confusing and contradictory tendencies
of the bifurcated discussion is the treatment of the recurrent issue of
case-by-case versus category-by-category decisions regarding either lia-
bility assignment or cost evaluation. To discuss these issues repetitively
as Calabresi does-first for general deterrence and then for specific de-
terrence-is a method practically guaranteed to make the reader over-
look what surely is the critically important point: that all categorization,
all departure from maximum individuation of judgment, is designed to
serve the "specific deterrence" function of centralizing the identification
and valuation of costs which a less centralized regime will fail to recog-
nize. A continuing, explicit focus on the duality of legislative function
would make it possible to speak coherently in different contexts of the
same technique-say a tax on heavy cars-as "specific deterrence" inso-
far as the tax is designed to force recognition of a cost which the legisla-
ture predicts will otherwise be ignored by that transaction-organizing
medium (liability insurance) which is expected to occupy the auto-ac-
cident field, but as "general deterrence" insofar as one means to empha-
size that use of the tax allows a more decentralized type of decision than
would be possible under a flat prohibition on use of heavy cars.
There remains something oddly troubling about Calabresi's choice of
terminology. He had available to him (and sometimes uses as a second-
string team) the parallel terms "collective" and "market" deterrence.
There can be no doubt about which of the latter terms applies to which
of the legislative functions. But the assignment of duties to the first
stringers is far from obvious. It is true that in reappraising decentralized
cost evaluations the legislature must focus on particular cost-creating
activities, and in that sense its action is "specific," as compared with the
"generality" of activities and costs covered by rules facilitating decen-
tralized transactions. But in another, and seemingly more pertinent
perspective, the appropriate terminology is reversed. Fully centralized
30. See pp. 69-75, 96-107.
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cost-reappraisal is meant to apply with like impact to all choice-makers
and thus is "general"; while a framework for decentralized transactions
is meant to facilitate solutions which are "specific" to particular choice-
makers and situations. Calabresi himself has written that "[g]eneral
deterrence... seeks to value accident costs on as individual a basis as
possible" 31-a statement which the uninitiated might find a rather
remarkable use of English.
V.
To illustrate further the clarifying power of Calabresi's theoretical
engine (and the import of the preceding discussion), I shall set it to
work on a problem which at first glance may appear rather far removed
from that of accidents. There is now abroad in the land a lively interest
in viewing private lawsuits as an important component of any system of
air-pollution control law. More specifically, there is great interest in
using privately-initiated nuisance litigation, perhaps with some modifi-
cation of the common law doctrines, in such a manner. My hypothesis
in what follows is that Calabresi's work can greatly assist us in under-
standing this notion (or family of notions), in uncovering its hidden
premises, in evaluating it, in finding a proper niche for nuisance law
in a total system and inferring thereby the sounder answers to mooted
doctrinal questions, and, conversely, in better understanding observed
judicial behavior in nuisance contexts. The discussion may at the same
time reveal some possible weaknesses in Calabresi's formulations and
arguments, or some limits on his vision imposed by his chosen context
of accident costs; in a number of relevant respects the pollution
problem is very different from the accident problem and Calabresi's
embroidery will, therefore, sometimes have to be stretched to fit the
new topic.
It is of the essence of an "accident" that, while the frequency of its
occurrence in general form may perhaps be statistically ascertained, its
particular incidence is unpredictable. Moreover, as soon as an accident
has occurred it is over, and can no longer be prevented. There is, in
short, an important sense in which any accident can be called uninten-
tional. This will not, however, be so of a continuing or recurrent dis.
charge of substances into the atmosphere, once someone interprets that
discharge as a cause of injury or grievance and chooses to make an
issue of it. At that point, a good deal is known about particular ini.
31. P. 95.
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dence: the injurer-victim relationship will have a forward extension in
time, prevention will still be possible, and a failure to prevent will be
intentional. This difference between "accidental" and "intentional"
injury will be seen to play an important part in what follows.
A. Anti-pollution "Myths"
It is best to begin by noting the obvious application to pollution
problems of Calabresi's concern about the already mentioned "myths."
Here, if anywhere, it is surely necessary to keep harping on the points
that our society is not--cannot sanely be-committed to preserving
absolute and pristine environmental "purity" no matter what the cost;
that, on the other hand, an industry's ability, even under strict tort
liability, to meet all the judgments against it and still make profits does
not fully answer the societal question; and that we are not limited to
a choice between tolerating pollution and imposing on industry the
total costs of prevention and clean-up, because the public can find ways
of paying or sharing those costs.
B. Anti-pollution "Perfect General Deterrence'"
Let us, however, momentarily suspend judgment as to the second
myth-that is, assume that individual households and firms can be
motivated by a well designed transactional framework to recognize and
monetize all pollution costs which ought to be deemed significant by
the legislature-and see what Calabresi has to tell us about the design
of such a framework. The most obvious form for such "perfect general
deterrence" might seem to be the pollution analogue to strict manu-
facturer's liability-a flat rule of strict emitter liability in "private
nuisance" actions. The "cost internalization" rationale for liberalized
standing and stricter liability principles in nuisance law is obviously
appealing to current commentators32 and one can imagine portions of
Calabresi's discussion being invoked as theoretical scaffolding for that
rationale. The power and value of Calabresi's treatment can be seen
in that it does, at the same time, reveal a need for discriminating use of
economic theory by the cost-internalizing school of nuisance-law com-
mentators. The most sweeping arguments for strict liability and liberal
"standing" criteria would apparently assume that polluters are nearly
always the cheapest cost avoiders, and while that assumption may have
32. See, e.g., Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38
U. CQN. L. REV. 587, 606-22 (1969); McCarthy, Recent Legal Developments in Environ.
mental Defense, 19 Burr. L REV. 195, 201 (1970).
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a certain gross plausibility for the whole universe of pollution-nuisance
cases, there is no a priori reason for believing it to be valid in any
particular case.33 In a given situation, the cheapest cost-avoiders may be,
say, the few residential neighbors who would have to relocate out of a
predominantly industrialized area.3 4 It seems necessary, therefore, to ask
whether a more individualized approach to liability assignments would
not be worthwhile. The flat rule of strict polluter liability would decide
"what-is-a-cost-of-what" on a "category-by-category" rather than a "case-
by-case" basis. But it is not true in cases of on-going pollution, as it is
in accident cases, that only category-by-category decisions are feasible
for general deterrence. Because each individual pollution case involves
future as well as past harms, useful internalizing can be achieved
through case-by-case allocation of liability. In this setting we cannot, as
we did when discussing accident cases, dismiss "case-by-case" liability
allocation as purely retrospective in import and therefore useless for
deterrent purposes (except as statistically extrapolated into categorical
form).3 5
In short, while "internalization" may be a well-stated goal for
nuisance law, the question whether that goal implies a general rule of
strict polluter liability is not so simple. The alternatives to such a rule
are at least two: the first would be a centralizing or specific deterrence
principle under which the court in each case imposes or withholds
liability according to how it "balances" the "true social costs of the
defendant's pollution" against "the cost to the polluter of purchasing
control equipment" or going out of business.30 The second would be a
decentralizing rule which differs from specific deterrence in that the
court imposes liability without deciding whether any given cost-
avoidance measure would actually prove worthwhile, but also differs
33. The assumption seems implicit throughout Muskie, Torts Transportation, and
Pollution: Do the Old Shoes Still Fit?, 7 HARV. J. LEGiS. 477 (1970), as well as In Katz,
supra note 32, and McCarthy, supra note 32. But see Note, The Cost.Internalization Case
for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. R v. 383, 391-92 (1969).
34. This possibility is easiest to see on the assumption that the only costs associated
with the discharges in question are those sustained in the immediate neighborhood-that
there is no dispersion of costly effects to the wider community. But the argument may
retain its importance even when that assumption is abandoned. For it may well be true
that the only costs which are cognizable and monetizable in a "perfect general deterrence"
framework are those sustained in the immediate neighborhood. It may be necessary to
rely on far more centralized methods to force polluters to take account of the more broadly
dispersed costs; in such a case, if a private nuisance suit has any proper role at all It
probably should ignore all but the extremely local, dearly monetizable costs (i.e., those
which would be counted in awarding compensatory damages to persons in the immediate
vicinity). See pp. 675-77 infra.
35. Cf. pp. 656-57 supra.
36. See Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington,
5 HA~v. Crv. Rxcsrrs-Civ. Lm. L. REV. 32, 86 (1970).
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from the flat -rule of strict liability in that liability is shifted only if the
court decides in a given case that the polluter is more likely than any-
one else to be able to avoid pollution costs cheaply, or that placing lia-
bility on the polluter's activity is the best way to find the cheapest
cost-avoider.37 A liability rule of the latter type would lead to the purest
application of Calabresian general deterrence to pollution/nuisance
law.
Let us explore it further by considering a hypothetical case involving
a smoke-belching factory which imposes substantial pollution costs on
the nearby residences. The circumstances, let us assume, are such that
the costs could be reduced or avoided by wet scrubbers installed at
the factory, or by air-conditioners installed in the homes. If we had a
strong suspicion about which cost-avoidance technique were the
cheaper, but retained some uncertainty about whether even that tech-
nique would produce worthwhile savings, the decentralizing solution
would be to impose liability directly on the party thought to have
control over the cheaper abatement technique, thereby setting up a
market test while avoiding the costs of transactions to locate the cheap-
est cost avoider. If, however, we were in genuine doubt about the
relative cost-effectiveness of the two technologically possible abatement
methods, then the goal of facilitating optimal transactions would have
us allocate liability initially so as to minimize not abatement costs, but
costs of market transactions seeking the cheapest cost avoider; in other
words, we should load liability initially on that side (the "best briber")
which can most cheaply organize the voluntary transactions necessary
to shift it if the initial placement turns out to have been wrong. So
argues Calabresi,38 and his argument seems correct as far as it goes. In
order to carry it further, however, we shall have to consider choices
which face the court concerning not only whether it should grant relief
to the complaining homeowner, but also the form of that relief. Inas-
much as pollution is often deliberate, continuous, and territorially
confined, it becomes possible at least in principle to use injunctions to
help create a market in pollution costs where a market in accident costs
is, as we have seen, impossible.39 It might be done, for example, by
holding the polluter liable to injunction at the behest of any signifi-
cantly affected receptor, but allowing for dissolution of the injunction
(or waiver of rights to seek its issuance) by agreement of the parties. The
37. See p. 670 infra.
38. See pp. 150-52.
59. See p. 658 supra.
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polluter could then be expected to bargain with receptors for con-
tractual releases of their claims, leading to optimization through market
comparison of pollution-avoidance costs at the plant with pollution costs
(or avoidance costs) at the homesites or other points of reception.
Yet although this method does at least open up the possibility of a far
purer version of market deterrence than seems attainable when dealing
with accidents, we must recognize that it may often involve high-
perhaps prohibitive-tertiary costs which might be avoided by a retreat
from maximum decentralization of cost appraisal; that is, by confining
relief to damages. This may be Calabresi's assumption when, straying
momentarily off the accident reservation and into the pollution field,
he remarks that "it is almost certainly cheaper for the [smoking] factory
to bribe homeowners than it is for homeowners to unite to bribe the
factory," and that making the factory liable would, therefore, "be
justified."40 For only on the assumption that liability is restricted to
money damages, and will not encompass injunctions, is it at all clear
that factories can bribe more cheaply than homeowners can.
In any given situation of this sort, three liability decisions are possi-
ble, and we should try to grasp the tertiary costs for each of them. The
rules are: (1) the homeowners (victims) are liable;41 (2) the factory is
liable to injunction against pollution at the behest of any homeowner
within range; and (3) the factory is liable only to damage judgments.
Under either rule (2) or rule (3), adherence to decentralizing principles
would require that the factory be free to bargain for releases from
homeowners.
Under rule (1) (homeowners liable), there are no litigation costs to
impede the mounting of cost pressure (i.e., against the homeowner).
Such pressure, however, can be effective in locating the cheapest cost
avoider only if the homeowners can organize themselves into a group
capable of negotiating with the factory for its commitment to certain
abatement procedures; and such organization, as Calabresi notes, may
entail prohibitive bargaining costs in identifying members of the
interested class, bringing them to agreement on how much to offer and
how to divide up the costs, and dealing with free-loaders. 42 If these costs
appear overwhelming in view of any primary pollution cost saving
40. P. 254.
41. "Liable" in the Calabresian sense that they will bear the costs, at least initially,
42. "The free-loader is . . . the person who refuses to join a union because the fact
that most other workers are union members assures him of the benefits of unionization
without the cost." P. 137 nA.
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which could flow from a factory-homeowner transaction, the result will
be "no deal."
Under rule (2) (factory liable to injunctions), litigation costs are
involved at the outset. They promise to be relatively low, however,
because a single lawsuit by a single plaintiff, involving only the issue of
whether the factory is in fact a source of significant pollution, will under
this rule suffice to "internalize" all costs to the factory; and indeed, this
relatively inexpensive suit will almost certainly be such an obvious and
credible threat that the factory will not wait to be sued before opening
negotiations with all the homeowners. The costs of these negotiations
may be heavy, however, because the factory will have to insist on a
package deal involving releases from each one of the potential plaintiffs
who singly could have it enjoined; and this, as in case (1), will mean
identifying all those persons, getting them to agree on terms, and
coping with hold-outs.43 So we again face the real danger of "no deal,"
with the shoe now on the other foot for no particularly good reason
(given our hypothetical inability to say who is the cheapest cost avoider).
Under rule (3) (factory liable to damages but not injunctions), the
costs of negotiations would clearly be brought under control. The
factory would be faced with the prospect of a periodically recurrent
income drain representing damages to be awarded from time to time to
each prospective plaintiff. It should thereby be motivated to consider,
with respect to each plaintiff, whether the combined costs of (i) buying
that plaintiff an air-conditioner and (ii) either paying that plaintiffs
residual damages as they accrue or securing from him a release from
such liability, will be more or less than the discounted value of the
damages that plaintiff would sustain without an air-conditioner. Of
course, there will be some negotiation costs whenever that comparison
points towards a transaction; but these will be minor compared with
those required under rules (1) and (2) because group bargains, with all
their special costs, are unnecessary. The factory can optimize by making
deals with all prospective plaintiffs who are so situated that an air-
conditioner seems worth its costs in pollution abatement, while leaving
more marginal victims to their damage remedies.
43. A hold-out is, of course, a free-loader in reverse-the person who won't chip in
his -release unless he gets the lion's share of the compensation available to the group as a
whole.
44. Alternatively, with some saving in litigation costs, lump-sum "permanent damages"
might be awarded-a kind of private eminent domain. But this method would facrifice the
continuing deterrent pressures exerted by the prospect of periodically recurrent damage
awards. After an award of "'permanent damages," the polluter is subject to no further
incentive to seek out improved abatement methods.
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But there is another side to this picture. Litigation costs may be
heavy under rule (8). A plaintiff must show not only that the factory
pollutes, but that he is thereby damaged in a specified dollar amount.
There will likely be at least some marginal victims for whom these costs
are prohibitive in light of the potential recovery-and as to their
injuries, at least, externalization will occur.45 The situation is compli-
cated by the fact that under this rule what-is-the-cost is decided collec-
tively-very likely meaning that costs which to a "reasonable man"
would seem speculative or idiosyncratic, however real and important to
the actual victims, may be externalized. This effect may further increase
the number of "marginal" victims (and the total magnitude of their
externalized injuries) who will not find it worthwhile to sue. It can,
moreover, encumber the bargaining process, making it more expensive,
because the factory and the homeowners may make different predictions
concerning how the collective tribunal will evaluate the non-monetiza-
ble costs.
From this discussion the following lessons seem to emerge: (1) In
applying a decentralist or transaction-organizing version of nuisance
law, the court may decide to shift liability to the polluter either because
it believes the polluter is the cheapest cost avoider or because it believes
that the polluter is the best briber. If the court acts on the latter
ground, it should be wary of negotiable injunctions with their heavy
negotiation costs which may prevent the polluter from bribing effec-
tively, and should probably confine relief to damages despite their
associated litigation costs and measurement difficulties. But if the court
acts on the former ground, it might be favorably disposed toward in-
junctive relief-partly in the interest of avoiding the heavier litigation
costs associated with damage judgments, and partly also because relief
in this form allows (indeed entails) some judicious infiltration of "spe-
cific deterrence." Injunctions can and often will be tailored to inter-
nalize to their supposedly cheapest avoider costs which it will be diffi-
cult to measure in damage judgments; 40 and even if the court tries to
restrain its focus to monetizable pollution costs, the injunction implies
at least a tentative substitution of judicial for market judgment on the
question of whether these costs are worth bearing for the sake of asso-
45. The problem could be altered, but not eliminated, by allowing non-frivolous
plaintiffs to recover their litigation costs-including counsel fees-from defendants. The
effect would be to make polluters over-value pollution costs to some extent.
46. That is, the court has to decide just what its decree will prohibit. It might attempt
to write a decree prohibiting only the infliction upon persons or property of the kind of
harm which supposedly would be compensated by a damage judgment. But the court
can, if it sees fit, compose a sterner decree than that.
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ciated production. (2) Either way, tertiary costs and/or measurement
difficulties seem to raise serious questions about the utility of highly
decentralist versions of nuisance litigation as a "cost-internalizing"
approach to air-pollution control.
Such skepticism may be reinforced by considering how our various
remedial approaches would be adapted to cases involving discharges
from multiple sources which cumulate or interact in creating a legally
cognizable grievance. We can reasonably insist in such cases that all the
contributing polluters be joined as defendants. It is unlikely that any
one of them would appear to be the cheapest avoider of all or most of
the costs; but it might turn out that one would-because, let us
imagine, it was the sole source of a catalytic discharge whose suppression
would wholly eliminate the problem. It is also possible, though un-
likely, that one of the polluting firms could be identified as the best
briber-because, let us say, of its dominant size and its ownership of a
majority of the pollution sources, widely scattered about the problem
area. In either of those cases, the court could issue an injunction, or
award compensatory damages, against the single firm identified as
cheapest cost avoider or best briber.47
It seems that in most multiple-source cases a decision to hold polluters
liable would reflect a grosser judgment that polluters as a group are
better cost avoiders or bribers than victims as a group. In such a case, a
court bent upon decentralization could either grant a negotiable injunc-
tion against all the polluters, leaving it to them to organize themselves
for purposes of bargaining collectively with victims for a set of releases;
or it could grant such an injunction subject to judicial dissolution
upon payment by the group of polluters of a total compensatory damage
judgment fixed by the court, with the polluters required to decide
among themselves how the burden should be shared.
A lawsuit culminating in either of the foregoing remedies would
epitomize the massive, basin-wide, cost-internalizing, transaction-organ-
izing, nuisance class action. It seems that each of these remedies could
47. This is not the only point, though it may be one of the most obvious, where
discussion trained on resource-allocation problems may seem grossly insensitivc to rather
obvious issues of justice. The recurrent issue, of course, is whether and when it can be
fair for society pursuing its resource allocation objectives deliberately to redistribute
income or wealth away from selected firms or households, no more or less blameworthy
than those who stand to benefit from these societal interventions. Practical techniques
for avoiding injustice without unduly impeding allocative pursuits might well take the
form of schemes, perhaps rather artificial and sophisticated schemes, for compensating
those who without distinguishing moral taint are deliberately selected for dispro-
portionately burdensome treatment. The subject deserves detailed attention; some pro-
legomena can be found in Micheman, Property, Utility, and Fairnes. Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAV. L R v. 1165 (1967).
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well entail prohibitive tertiary costs. This latter possibility should cer-
tainly increase our wariness about just how heavily we wish to rely on
such a "pure general deterrence" approach to pollution control law-
assuming we have not from the outset been utterly disenchanted by
the assumption which has governed this whole discussion, that astute
placement of liabilities, and deployment of compensatory damage
awards and negotiable injunctions, can motivate households and firms
to take proper account of all pollution costs worth worrying about.
C. Centralization of Pollution Cost Control
The notion of a highly centralized process of pollution-cost optimiza-
tion seems to involve its own set of heroic assumptions-mostly about
the existing state of knowledge regarding (a) how to detect and rele-
vantly quantify emissions of any given pollutant from any given
source; (b) how to describe, "model," or predict the process of inter-
action-as conditioned by air flows, temperature, sunlight, etc.-
among all emissions from all interacting sources in a problem-shed; (C)
how to predict and value the impacts on health, property, and amenity
of the products of that process; and (d) how to predict the cost of the
most efficient means of constraining any given emission to a selected
volume, rate, or pattern. But if we could assume such knowledge, then
the case for centralization would seem amply established by a further
undoubted characteristic of the total air-pollution problem: that many
of the benefits implied by atmospheric purity are goods not easily
monetizable or accounted for in private transactions. 4 That circum-
stance at least suggests a need for centralized determination of what
total situations should be deemed costly at all. Such a determination
might most naturally take the form of ambient air standards for a
"problem-shed." That is, we would say collectively that significant costs
are being sustained when the standards are exceeded-irrespective of
how much monetary loss is demonstrable by an individual, and irrespec-
tive of whether any single actor can be blamed. That the costs had
been collectively deemed significant would not necessarily show that
they were such as to warrant restriction or limitation of any of the
activities which jointly "caused" them, nor would resort to the market
for an answer to that question necessarily be precluded by the inability
48. Among these goods we should probably include not only such obvious ones as
blue sky, dean-smelling air, and satisfaction in keeping things more or less as nature
provided, but also the avoidance of such damage to personal health as might otherwise be
accumulating in increments too small for any victim to notice or take account of In
voluntary transactions. Significant involvement of non-monetizable costs Is cited by
Calabresi as a leading reason for resort to specific deterrence. See Pp. 97-100.
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of individuals to monetize these costs. Instead of nuisance suits, in
which cost valuations are made on a case-by-case basis and so are fixated
on more or less traumatic impacts on determinate persons or property,
we could have a modified type of decentralization in which both lia-
bility assignments and cost valuations were made categorically, rather
than case by case. This might be a system of emission charges so cali-
brated as to approximate some or all of the external costs of the class
and rate of emissions in question.49
But even this much decentralization may be hard to maintain. A
pollution problem often emerges from accumulation and/or interaction
of emissions from several unrelated sources, and can be efficiently
controlled only by a set of penally-sanctioned emission standards assign-
ing specific "quotas" to the various polluters in the picture.r0 This
sort of one-fell-swoop, collective cost-benefit decision and allocation of
the cost among polluters would reflect the cumulative and "synergistic"
attributes of the total problem. Where much depends on thresholds,
margins, cumulations, and interactions, the size of any one activity's
costs depends heavily on what other activities are up to; and there may
be no way, without highly structured collective action, of bringing
home to each activity some determinate and appropriate share of the
total cost.51 Whether producer A may emit particulates may depend on
whether some other producer within some given air-current distance is
emitting gaseous pollutants; whether producer B may emit a little
sulphur dioxide depends on who else in the vicinity is emitting how
much; and so forth. It may be that the necessary collective decision-
making can be internally structured so as to simulate a market to
some limited extent; but collective the decision would remain.t2
D. Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Subsystems
The question of whether private nuisance suits, governed by decen-
tralizing principles as discussed above, should coexist with an emission-
fee system turns on what costs or types of costs were considered in
49. Compare Calabresi's discussion of the "limitation" technique at pp. 114-19.
50. Such quotas might be laid on directly, or might conceivably be the result of
bargaining within a basin-wide collective control system whereby each polluter's quota is
determined by how much he is willing to pay in return.
51. See Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution, 83
H~Av. L. RPv. 1527, 1554 (1970). The situation may be such that "any rule that requires
all plants to cut back their pollution by a specified percentage or to provide a spedfied
level of treatment is bound to be very inefficient." Id. at 1543.
52. This case seems related to the class, described by Calabresi at p. 178, in which "a
difficult (and therefore expensive) decision [about whom to regulate] under general
deterrence guidelines may be easy [easir, anyway] if specific deterrence criteria are con-
sidered as well."
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setting the fees. If the fees purported to reflect all costs to society of
which emitters in the affected class were deemed to be the cheapest
avoiders, to saddle the fee-payers with additional compensatory damage
liabilities would in principle cause a misallocation by making polluters
pay twice for the same costs. However, in light of the extent to which
proper pollution cost-accounting may depend on particular local situa.
tions, a broad-category emission-fee system might well be designed to
cover only that irreducible minimum of costs which particular dis-
charges were deemed to cause irrespective of any special factors in the
local situation. In that case, any partial "double-payment" which im-
position of nuisance judgments would cause might lead to less misalloca-
tion than entirely foregoing the nuisance judgment's capacity to bring
special local costs to bear on their cheapest avoiders. Double payment
could be avoided by reducing compensatory-damage awards by the
amount of emission fees paid or to be paid; or by making plaintiffs
reimburse defendants in this amount as the price of receiving an
injunction.
If we assume a more drastic form of centralization, assigning fixed
quotas to each polluter in an airshed, is there then any role for
transaction-organizing private lawsuits? We should first note that even
if nuisance doctrine simply disappeared from the air pollution field,
some minor amount of "general deterrence" would probably continue to
occur through voluntary transactions between emitters and receptors,
insofar as the collective controls left any room for private choice. And
so the question must be faced whether it would be worthwhile to try to
structure these transactions, and their deterrent consequences, through
legal rules for shifting liabilities and assessing costs.
Three possibilities may be considered: (1) nuisance suits might be
allowed only for activities conforming to the collective controls; (2)
nuisance suits might be allowed only for activities which violate the
collective controls; (3) nuisance suits might be allowed irrespective of
whether activity violates the collective controls.
As for the first possibility, if measurable injury were demonstrably
caused by activity which conformed to a comprehensive set of central-
ized regulations, the problem might seem to be one which was not
thought relatively big or general enough to receive attention in a
basin-wide scheme of regulation, most likely because it affected only a
few persons. Under these circumstances, private suits might be rela-
tively unimportant but still worth their tertiary costs for their service
in backstopping or filling in the specific-deterrence scheme. They might
also provide a guidance function, bringing to our attention that the
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collective controls are generally weaker than they "ought" to be.
But there are possible counter-arguments. The very reasons that
certain pollution costs might have been ignored by a comprehensive
regulatory scheme-i.e., because they affect injuriously only a few
activities in the immediate vicinity-also suggest that the victims
themselves might be the cheapest cost-avoiders or, if they are not, that
the appropriate shifting can occur through the marketas Moreover, it
is perfectly possible under centralization that the regulatory scheme has
been deliberately calibrated to allow some polluters to inflict some harm
on some neighbors. If that is so, then allowing market deterrence of
these emissions--either by legal shifting of liability through nuisance
doctrine or by contractual shifting through bribes of polluters by
neighbors-will undercut the premises of the regulatory scheme (for
example, that the neighbors are the best cost avoiders). It at least seems
that a court in any private nuisance suit ought to consider whether-
in light of the history and evident premises (assuming there are some)
of any collective regulatory system-such substantive pre-emption
should apply.-4
Whether or not substantive pre-emption is deemed applicable, the
question of procedural pre-emption remains. Suppose we conclude that
nuisance suits should be precluded as long as activity conforms to collec-
tive regulations. The further argument for disallowing nuisance suits as
to activity violating the regulations is that otherwise we would have
wasteful overlap, and perhaps interference between private and public
enforcement.
It is fair to rejoin at this point that the private suit might serve to fill
an enforcement gap left by laggard public officials; but we should note
that the argument here takes leave of any notion that private litigation
is important for transaction-facilitating purposes. Private suits main-
tainable only against activity which violates collective regulations are
nothing but a means for enforcing resource-allocation decisions made
entirely outside any private-law framework and entirely without partici-
pation by judges or litigants; "private attorney general" is, indeed, the
paradoxically apt locution. The necessarily appropriate remedy is a
non-negotiable injunction against further violation of the collective
53. Cf. pp. 223-24, and p. 668 supra.
54. This assumes that we trust the regulators to do their jobs properly, and so have
in mind only a residual function for private litigation. If, on the other hand, we assume
that regulators are not to be trusted and that our main reliance should be placed on the
courts, then no forbearance by regulators, no matter how deliberate, should precludejudicial shifting of liability. But the court would then be playing a "specific deterrence."
not a "general deterrence," role. See pp. 678, 679-80 infra.
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controls. Damages, if awarded on top of such an injunction, serve no
cost-internalizing or resource-allocating purpose. They may be appro-
priate for reasons of compensation or incentive (to undertake enforce-
ment), but they have nothing directly to do with inducing optimal
decisions about resource use.
It appears, then, that private lawsuits might play a useful interstitial
or guidance role in cases where collective-deterrence standards have left
an obvious cost unaccounted for; and that they might substitute for
derelict officialdom in the enforcement of collective standards. But if
these uses exhaust the list (in a world being taken over by comprehen-
sive regulatory schemes), then perhaps a serious question exists about
whether nuisance law really deserves all the attention it is currently
receiving.
Some may feel that I have dismissed too casually the possible utility
of compensatory damages as an adjunct to collective-deterrence stan-
dards. Would it not, they might ask, be an ideal marriage to let the
standards be fashioned collectively, and then let enforcement proceed
exclusively through private suits-including massive class actions-
leading to compensatory damage remedies? Wouldn't such damages be
the ideal means of "internalizing" the costs of violating those controls
collectively deemed desirable? Calabresi provides reasons for believing
that the answer is no."o He gives them in the context of explaining the
irrationality of the "fault" system of automobile liability if regarded as
a device for primary-cost optimization. Reworking his arguments to fit
our context, we would note that the legislature has, presumably, re-
sorted to centralized dictation of performance standards because of its
awareness of certain costs which it believes would go unnoticed in a
more decentralized choice system. Since there is no apparent reason why
the legislature would want to disregard costs which individuals would
monetize, it must be true that the total costs which the central regula.
tions mean to "internalize" to polluters exceed those which would be
reflected in compensatory damage judgments fully covering all emis-
sions (as under the "strict polluter liability" rule). But the error which
the legislature evidently believes would arise from reliance on strict
polluter liability is, obviously, compounded if recovery is limited to
damages caused by activities violating centrally dictated standards and
55. They may serve a "deterrent" function in the "specific deterrence" sense in which
the prospect of penal fines and jail sentences is supposed to "deter." But that suggegtn
completely different criteria for determining the amount of the award than those indicted
by either an internalization or a compensation objective. See also pp. 679-80 infra.
56. See p. 276.
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no other enforcement is undertaken. If, on the other hand, enforcement
is forthcoming in the form which seems most appropriate to the
premises underlying central dictation-that is, injunctions or effective
in terrorem punishments-compensatory damages are quite superfluous
as regards any "internalization" objective. The "ideal marriage" can
begin to make sense only where the sanctions for violation are restricted
to financial penalties of a size so moderate as to indicate that they were
not meant to function in terrorem, and then only by imputing to the
legislature a design so extremely sophisticated as to strain credulity,
namely: (a) a decision that emissions not in excess of the centrally
dictated standards involve no costs worth bothering with, and (b) a
decision to divide the burden of internalizing the costs of excess emis-
sions by (i) setting financial penalties designed to cover their non-
monetizable costs while (ii) leaving their monetizable costs to be in-
ternalized by compensatory damages.
The strain on credulity is enhanced by some further considerations:
to fit the logic of this scheme damage recoveries would have to be
limited to compensation not for total monetizable costs inflicted by the
unauthorized activity, but for the marginal monetizable costs caused by
the excess of actual emissions over permitted emissions; and it seems
unlikely that litigation could often yield a satisfactorily precise estimate
of this figure. Given this inevitable crudity in the cost estimates we can
expect from litigation, it is hard to see why a legislature should be
supposed to have hit upon this particular division of labor.&7
There remains at least one other possible ground for believing that
private lawsuits should have an important role in an anti-pollution
program, even conceding (for the reasons and on the assumptions stated
earlier),08 that the laboring oar must be left to rather highly centralized
cost appraisals. Skepticism about officialdom's will and capacity may
apply not only to enforcement but also to standard-setting. One might
believe that a "truer" or more optimal solution is likely to come out of
"specific deterrence" organized by class suitors, courts, and polluters in
the context of massive nuisance class actions than out of the administra-
tive methods presently being charted for us-somewhat haphazardly-
by federal and state legislators.
Any suggestion that nuisance law should be reconstructed into a kind
57. It may be noted that neither of Calabresi's two conditions (see p. 120) for using
specific deterrence "on an involvement basis" is satisfied. It is not the case either that the
collectively disfavored conduct defies adequate definition outside of an actual involvement
context, or that violations are undetectible except where there has bcen some traumatic
"involvement."
58. See pp. 674-75 supra.
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of judicially administered specific-deterrence system-that it should
become the engine of collective cost appraisal-carries some implica-
tions worth noting. The first and most important is that such an attribu-
tion of purpose to nuisance law seems to argue not for any move
towards the transaction-facilitation notions of "strict liability," but
rather for retention of something very like the "reasonableness"
principle, under which liability is shifted to the polluter only if the
court concludes that the costs inflicted by given emissions exceed the
costs of their abatement.5 9 In the context of a basin-wide class action,
this might entail a step-wise process in which the court (presumably
through expert testimony) tried to identify the optimal abatement
scheme 0 and then balanced its cost (including "opportunity" costs)
against pollution costs thereby saved, basing its liability-placing
decision on the outcome of that balancing. The appropriate remedy
would, apparently, be a non-negotiable injunction against any emissions
in excess of ceilings established as part of the optimal scheme.01 It
should be noted that this outcome may well be different from that
reached under a transaction-facilitating version of nuisance law; 2 for,
although a specific-deterrence decision to enjoin polluters certainly
entails a decision that they are the cheapest03 cost avoiders, a court
using general deterrence principles would not upon reaching such a
conclusion dictate an abatement program, but rather would simply
award damages, or else enjoin all further pollution subject to the
acquisition of releases.
The kind of judicial role we are now envisioning provides a special
opportunity to test the unraveling power of Calabresi's tools, inasmuch
as it throws into the sharpest possible relief one of the knottiest prob-
lems of traditional nuisance law-that of how a court should respond
to the likelihood that its injunction, if granted, will force an enterprise
out of business and thereby spark some severe (even if theoretically
short-run) local economic troubles.
59. See RarrsrATm.rir OF TORTS §§ 822, 826, 827 (1939).
60. To do this properly may require some decidedly "unjudicial" involvement on the
court's part, because in all probability the issue is not a matter of two simple alternatives,
The optimum probably lies somewhere along a non-linear series of technological possibili.
ties between zero-abatement/maximum-pollution and total-abatement/zero pollution. Sec
FuLLER, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator in COLLECvtE BARGAINING AND TillE
ARBIrrAToi's RoLE 8 (M. Kahn ed. 1962).
61. Since the collective-deterrence decision to hold the polluters liable already in.
corporates an overarching cost-benefit judgment, it would seem wrong to incur the heavy
tertiary costs likely to be associated with prospective damage remedies in the context of
a basin-wide case.
62. See pp. 672-73 supra.
63. Or that they are the "best" cost avoiders; see p. 175.
680
Vol. 80: 647, 1971
Reviews
Up to this point, our discussion of pollution control has not touched
on secondary costs; and the problem of secondary costs-in the simple
and direct sense of avoidable loss from cumulation of costs on one
person at one moment in time--does indeed seem prima facie less
significant in a pollution context than when dealing with accidents.
The concept of "pollution" itself implies that primary costs in their
initial incidence are already spread rather widely among victims. While
there are, of course, some exceptional cases which would belie this
statement, the fact remains that the suddenness, immensity, and crisis
which are somewhat characteristic of accidents, and tend to imbue them
with significant secondary costs, are not very typical of nuisance/pollu-
tion cases. While avoidance of secondary costs through spreading
plausibly seems to some observers a prime goal of accident-cost compen-
sation systems,64 it can safely be said that the reasons for social interven-
tion to shift pollution or nuisance costs away from victims and onto
enterprises lie almost completely in spheres other than secondary-cost
avoidance.
In fact, it is the shifting which is most likely to precipitate (rather
than disperse) crushing cost accumulations; and it is at the point of
shifting that the spectre of secondary costs can be seen to play a major
complicating role in the design of anti-pollution programs, particularly
in that "program" which consists of private nuisance law. Calabresi's
intimation of an endemic conflict between primary and secondary cost
avoidance is thus vindicated. For concern about secondary costs may
well lie at the root of the common judicial timidity about whether
major industrial (or municipal) polluters should be held liable at all
and about whether, if so, injunctive as well as monetary remedies should
be granted.
It may not be immediately evident that secondary costs are playing a
role here. For judicial indulgence in such "utility balancing" could be
thought justified by the aim of primary-cost avoidance, insofar as reduc-
tion of enterprise output is recognized as a cost which must be traded off
against whatever gains will accrue from restrictions, and insofar as the
variables which courts purport to notice-such as payroll size and value
of industrial plant-are valid surrogates for the community's evaluation
of the product. Yet, as we have seen, these considerations may be incon-
clusive as long as concern is restricted to primary-cost optimization,
because it may be unclear whether that goal is not best achieved by
shifting legal liability to the polluter, leaving him to buy his way out if
64. See, e.g., %. SEAVEY, P. KEErON & R. KEErON, LAW OF ToRs 220 (Supp. 1970).
681
The Yale Law Journal
he can "afford" to.05 But suppose there is fear about secondary costs-
costs in human demoralization, wasted plant, community disintegration,
or social unrest which will not accrue at all unless primary-cost liability
is shifted to the enterprise. It will then be at least possible that, while
the value of the enterprise's products and services will by itself be too
low to cover the pollution cost being shifted onto it (with the designed
result that the enterprise will cease), the total of this value plus the
secondary costs which it is feared cessation would cause exceeds the
benefits of pollution abatement. On these assumptions, a shift of lia-
bility to the enterprise could seem inclined towards market determina-
tions which are, at least for the short term, socially sub-optimal. The
enterprise, in deciding whether it was productive enough to cover the
newly shouldered pollution cost and still be worthwhile, presumably
would not weigh any secondary-cost savings on the side of staying in
business (that is, the secondary costs would be externalized), because it
would have no way of recouping these costs from its customers through
the market. The secondary cost-savings would not represent service or
product value for which consumers will pay. They would represent a
cost which could be avoided by declining to shift liability, and therefore
would seem a necessary offset against whatever primary-cost savings
shifting might bring about. Where a court is the tribunal appointed to
decide whether to decree shifting, there seems no avoiding judicial
consideration (no matter how inarticulate) of such costs.,, Thus it
appears that awareness of the secondary-cost problem may help explain
-more convincingly than a simple concern for primary-cost optimiza-
tion-judicial refusal to disregard economic disclocation as a relevant
factor in nuisance cases.
But it does not follow that we should rest satisfied with this sort of
judicial behavior, especially if we take a long-term view. To stop here
would be to succumb to Calabresi's myth of the "necessary financial
65. See pp. 672-73 supra. See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 109 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
66. One can at least speculate about the possibility that these costs could be weighcd
in an expanded market process which would operate in the wake of an "internalizing"
judicial injunction, granted as soon as it appeared that the enterprise was a substantial
pollution source. The enterprise would continue to function only if releases could be
secured from all persons having standing to secure and enforce the injunctive remedy, The
total price of these releases would be at least equal to the combined costs suffered by these
persons. The problematical case is one where the enterprise itself would not find It
worthwhile to pay so large a price, but the difference between this price and what the
enterprise would pay is exceeded by secondary costs which would accrue to employees,
individual investors, and governments if the enterprise decided not to pay. Might we then
expect these other groups and agencies to chip in with the enterprise to buy releases front
the prospective plaintiffs? It seems likely that the costs of organizing any such complex
transaction would be prohibitive. See pp. 670-73 supra.
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link" between injurers and victims. For it seems likely that this
secondary-cost problem can be greatly alleviated by governmental
spreading, without serious detriment to the deterrence needed for
primary-cost control. Suppose that federal and state governments were
to declare themselves ready, through various programs and devices
(perhaps including unemployment compensation, job-retraining and
relocation payment, lump-sum "severence pay" to stricken owners, and
emergency aid to stricken local governments) to compensate sufficiently
to minimize secondary costs resulting from any business shut-down
caused by uncompromising use of nuisance law in the pursuit of pri-
mary-cost optimization. Such a promise of succor would not impede
the deterrent effects of nuisance doctrine if the court were engaged in
"specific deterrence" and therefore issuing non-negotiable injunctions.
Even in a "general-deterrence" (strict liability) version of nuisance law,
using negotiable injunctions or damages to force a "proper" market
judgment, it seems unlikely that the prospect of governmental relief
in case of shut-down would cause much externalization. The goal is to
make the firm decide whether its operation is worth continuing if
required to cover all of its associated pollution costs; if the decision
must be that termination is the cheapest solution, it is hard to see
how a prospect that government will cushion the blow (mainly the
blow to others) will unduly bias owners or managers towards such a
naturally repugnant conclusion.
VI.
I suggested earlier that if we are to regard nuisance suits as a vehicle
of "specific deterrence," the appropriate standard for emitter liability
should be whether there exists some possible alteration of emitter con-
duct whose pollution-cost savings would exceed its costs. As elaborated
above, that suggestion embodies the same questionable assumptions
about presently available information and technology which also
governed the preceding discussion of a centralized, administered cost-
appraisal system. Some close students of the problem believe that
relevant knowledge is presently too sparse and primitive to support
accurate and dependable administration of a finely calibrated, coordi-
nated, basin-wide quota or fee system.67 One ought, therefore, at least to
wonder whether a Calabresian analysis can help us find the most
rational way to proceed in the face of such a knowledge gap.
67. See J. Esposrro, supra note 8, at 174-81.
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Tentatively, I believe that it can. The basic intellectual operation
required is to find a way of viewing the knowledge gap in "cost" terms.
By this I don't mean simply an arbitrary (or sophisticated) assignment
of a dollar-cost figure to "unknown" consequences of pollutant dis-
charges, but a recognition that ignorance (or uncertainty) may itself be
costly no matter what the truth eventually turns out to be.
Indications are that large numbers of people are specially sensitive to
and disturbed by suspected but undetermined environmental hazards.
Insofar as this is so, it would seem that the uneasy condition of suspicion
accompanied by uncertainty should itself be counted a primary cost of
pollution. As with any other suggestion about possible costs, this one
would present a legislature with the necessity to consider how a set of
decentralized transactions might best be ordered so as recognize, mone-
tize, and find the cheapest way to avoid any such "uncertainty costs"
as are believed to deserve recognition; and, on the other hand, how far
and by what means the identification and evaluation of such costs must
be centrally taken over to assure that they can be appropriately counted
and avoided without undue tertiary costs.
Such an approach will, I believe, greatly assist efforts to analyze,
appraise, and perhaps improve some of the more extreme-sounding
current proposals for anti-pollution rules-such as that all pollution
should be stopped, or all polluters required to use the most potent
known abatement technology, irrespective of how the measurable costs
of compliance compare with those of non-compliance. Proponents of
such rules might, to be sure, believe that if the costs of pollution were
fully known and properly measured (and if measurement of compliance
costs were purged of self-serving alarmism), pollution costs would in
most or all cases be seen to exceed compliance costs. Observers who
find such predictions outlandish or wildly speculative may find it more
satisfying to understand these rules as reflecting a feeling that uncer-
tainty costs should themselves be weighed heavily in favor of pollution
abatement.
Uncertainty costs imply their own special and related set of abate-
ment costs-that is, the costs of overcoming the ignorance which
grounds the uncertainty. Calabresi's first myth applies here as else-
where: the costs of overcoming ignorance may or may not be worth
their combined benefits in dispelling uncertainty and improving cost-
benefit analysis of the underlying pollution-versus-abatement problem.
But recognition that uncertainty is independently costly, and that in-
formation development is the way to avoid its costs, suggests that rules
regarding pollution control should (among other objectives) seek to
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maximize the probabilities that uncertainty costs will be brought to
bear against those who could most cheaply avoid them by developing
the responsive information.
Proposed rules such as "zero pollution" and "maximum feasible
abatement" seem to make the most sense if understood as legislative
attempts to assign a value to uncertainty costs and internalize them to
their cheapest avoiders. So understood, I believe, the rules will appear
to be not wildly irrational but significantly flawed. Among other de-
fects, they seem to assume that polluters are the cheapest developers of
all relevant information. That seems likely to be true of some informa-
tion-particularly regarding potential abatement technology which is
specific to a polluter's own activity. But as to other information-for
example, regarding atmospheric chemistry, or long-term health conse-
quences of various atmospheric conditions, or potential "abatement"
through community land-use planning-polluters seem unlikely to
be the cheapest developers when compared with other candidates such
as specialized scientific research institutes and local or regional agencies,
whose efforts are appropriately supported by public funds.
A sound Calabresian attack on this complex problem might begin by
including subordinate public agencies-such as municipal governments
-along with private firms among the group of decentralized choice-
makers to be "deterred" and incited by carefully sculpted liability rules.
For starters, one might consider the deterrent and incentive effects of
the following regime (to be established by state general law):
A state agency would maintain a list of substances known or suspected
to be harmful to health or environmental quality when present in the
atmosphere in amounts likely to be encountered, in some places at
some times, if legal controls are non-existent. Any citizen would be
entitled to sue for an injunction against any detectible emission of a
listed substance not authorized by a permit issued by a politically
responsible local (or regional) government agency. Any citizen would
further be entitled to judicial review and invalidation of a permit,
unless the evidence showed convincingly that the suspected harms
(which underlie the listing of the substance in question) would not
accrue under the permit except in limited magnitudes outweighed by
the productive potential thereby released. The local agency would be
empowered to levy general taxes to support anti-pollution administra-
tion, research, relocation and compensation of families and enterprises
disturbed by measures designed to minimize harms from the granting
of permits, and regulation of future growth for the purpose of mini-
mizing pollution costs. The agency would also be empowered to impose
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emission fees according to a general schedule, or to charge a negotiated
price or special emission-fee schedule in return for any permit-the
proceeds in either case to be available only for purposes of pollution
abatement and related research, relocation, planning, and administra-
tion.
Consideration and further pursuit of such possibilities seem worth-
while. It might, indeed, be a task worthy of the maestro himself.
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